INTRODUCTION
THE NOTION of perfect competition as generally stated in economic literature involves a market with a "very large" number of traders, each of whom has at most a "negligible" effect on the eventual outcome of the trading process. The mathematical literature on general equilibrium has taken less than full advantage of this concept. The classic mathematical approaches to the proof of existence of general equilibrium (e.g., [9]) have assumed that every consumer maximizes utility under budget constraint, regardless of the number of consumers in the market. Thus, they have not taken advantage of the friction that has been built into the system. If individual traders are really negligible we should be just as interested in a situation where all but a few traders maximize subject to constraint as we are in the case where they all maximize. The actions of a small number of negligible individuals or the small actions of a large number of negligible individuals should be negligible.
One result of this mathematician's strictness is the insistence on the convexity of individual preferences. For in order to apply the various fixed-point theorems, which are used to prove the existence of equilibrium, it is required that excess demand functions be continuous (for the Brouwer theorem) or that excess demand correspondences be convex (for the Kakutani theorem). Strictly speaking, these will generally be the case only when individual preference sets are convex. It will be shown, however, that if the number of traders is sufficiently large there is a configuration under which the divergence from equilibrium can be made small relative to the size of the market.
The motivation for the elimination of the convexity assumption, aside from its being less than absolutely essential, is that it postulates away all forms of indivisi- ' The major portion of the work presented here was done at Stanford University. This version embodies improvements made both there and at The RAND Corporation since originally issued under ONR contract Nonr-225 (50) (NR-047-004). Any views expressed in this paper are those of the author. They should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of The RAND Corporation or the official opinion or policy of any of its governmental or private research sponsors. bilities and a class of relations one might call anticomplementarities.3 After all, one may be indifferent between an automobile and a boat, but in most cases one can neither drive nor sail the combination of half boat, half car.4
THE MODEL
The model used here is patterned after that of McKenzie [9]. A pure exchange economy is treated, though I think it is clear that whenever an equilibrium exists in the convex case with production, the introduction of production to the non-convex case leaves the situation virtually unaltered.
There are n commodities. A commodity bundle is a vector in the nonnegative orthant 2 of En. Every trader t has a transitive, reflexive, complete preference relation tt defined on all the commodity bundles. Assume tion of an arbitrarily large market or, alternatively, a sequence of markets, the number of elements in the successive markets increasing without bound. In order to make the treatment as general as possible, there are no restrictions on the order in which the traders are taken, nor is it required that the above mentioned successive markets be contained in their successors. The limits achieved in the sequel could be somewhat stronger, were one to be less general on this point.
SYNTHETIC CONVEX EQUILIBRIUM
A set is convex if the straight line segment joining any two points of the set lies entirely within the set. The convex hull of a set of points is the closure of the intersection of all the convex sets containing the set in question. Since the intersection of convex sets is also convex, the convex hull may be thought of as the "smallest" closed convex set containing the original set. From the linear character of the definition of convexity it follows that, intuitively, the convex hull of a set is nothing more than the original set with a hyperplanar segment added to the boundary wherever the set fails to be convex. In effect, we have boarded up the holes. Denote by A, (x) the set {y: y -x} and by At(x) the convex hull of this set.
An assumption peculiar to treatments of non-convexity is required to make the rest of the discussion meaningful. This is the assumption of spannability, originating with Shapley Assumption C can be derived from the irreducibility of the non-convex market, though the converse is not generally true. The reader may satisfy himself of this merely by noting that x* is in At (z) whenever it is in At (z), and that x* is interior to At(z) whenever it is interior to At(z).
We assume that it has been shown (see Appendix 1) that there exists an n-dimensional vector p which constitutes a price system such that excess demand is nil in all markets. There are certain other relevant facts about the traditional existence of general equilibrium to be adduced here. For each t in the market, there is an equilibrium consumption vector xt with the property that it belongs both to a preference set and a budget set. That is, Xt ktX for all xeBt(p) where Bt(p)= {x:
p -x = p -it. One must insist on the feasibility constraint, XteM Xt = teM it.
THE ROTHENBERG EQUILIBRIUM
The question now is how close to the convex case can we stay if we reintroduce the not necessarily convex preferences with which we started? We noted in Section 3 that any point on the boundary At(x) is the convex combination of points of the boundary of At (x). Of course, this includes the possibility that the point in question is a point of the boundary of At(x) to start with. Consider xt. We know that it is on the boundary of Akt (xt), and is therefore the convex sum of points of the boundary of At(x) for some x such that At(x) = Akt(xt). Choose any such set of points 
Given p, for each t in M, define Et(p) to be {z(1)}. If S is a set of points in En, let CH (S) denote the convex hull of S. Then it has just been shown that 0e CH (Et (p)).
At this point it is necesswary to call into play the friction that has traditionally been built into perfectly competitive systems. There would be no problem if, as in [1, 2], the traders were infinitesimally small. In the present model the friction, the lack of a completely smoothly working market, is interpreted as a device for overcoming the lumpiness of the traders. The simplest rigorous way to handle the problem is to define a Rothenberg equilibrium as an assignment 5t of commodity bundles to traders under a price system, p, such that for each t e Me N, p -it =P p x, and such that for no more than n-1 traders does it fail to be true that 5t >,x for all xeB,(p).' This approach has certain obvious intuitive disadvantages. It saddles a few traders with the unpleasantness associated with the non-convexities of the whole society. Moreover, in an operational sense there is no obvious means by which they can be made to act appropriately in the market. It seems ultimately to depend on just what sort of system of precedence is set up among the traders. Q.E.D.
RELATIONS WITH THE LITERATURE
The reader is probably already quite aware of the classic proofs of the existence of competitive equilibrium with convex preferences. There have been several heuristic treatments by economists of markets with non-convex preferences in two dimensions (see [3, 4, 7, 10]). In any rigorous sense, however, the question of nonconvexity has been dealt with much better by game theorists than by economists.
There have been two fairly general approaches using game theoretical techniques not so abstruse as to obscure the conclusions for the economist, originating with Aumann [1, 2] and Shapley and Shubik [12] . Both use core analysis. The core of a game-in this case a market game is the set of all those outcomes which no player or coalition of players can profitably prevent. In general, the competitive equilibrium, when it exists, is contained in the core; there may be points in the core unattainable as competitive equilibria.
Professor Aumann assumes a market with uncountably many traders. Under these conditions, and various other fairly traditional assumptions on the preference sets (not including convexity), he shows that the core coincides with the set of competitive equilibria. Moreover, he goes on to show the existence of such equilibria. Professor Aumann's model is certainly a mathematically elegant approach to the question of perfect competition. Aumann's model, however, has an aspect that is conceptually distressing, though mathematically necessary. For though the number of traders is uncountable, the quantity of commodities is finite, thus leaving almost all traders with literally next to nothing. Though it seems reasonable to treat an individual as 5 x 10-of the United States economy, I find it difficult to conceive of him as 0 of it. Nevertheless, the use of uncountably many traders is certainly a simple and admirable device for embodying the concept of perfect competition and for providing the friction in the system necessary to assure existence even with non-convexities. With respect to existence, it seems to me that the results of this paper as m-oo are conceptually, though not mathematically, equivalent to Aumann The sixth assumption is the irreducibility of the market: "However we may partition the consumers into two groups if the first group receives an aggregate trade which is an attainable output for the rest of the market, the second group has within its feasible aggregate trades one which, if added to the goods already obtained by the first group, can be used to improve the position of someone in that group while damaging the position of none there" (p. 59). This is Assumption C.
Under assumptions 1-6, McKenzie proves the existence of a price vector peQ and an assignment x, of goods to traders satisfying appropriate maximization and feasibility conditions. As shown, this proof and its conclusions are applicable to the pure exchange, convex preference model of Section 3. In some markets all the spannability required may be deducible from assumptions not directly related to those adduced here. For instance, if we know, for whatever reasons (e.g., at least one trader t has a strong desirability condition and i, > 0), p > 0, then this condition guarantees enough spannability for the purposes of this paper. A fairly general set of individual conditions ensuring spannability even with zero prices of some goods is presented here. For convenience we drop a good deal of notation and refer to At(w) as A.
Consider the three conditions: 
